JAMSHID
GHARAJEDAGHI AND RUSSELL L. ACKOFF
Summary
We
live in an age of accelerating change, increasing uncertainty and growing
complexity. People are being pushed and pulled by forces that previously
did not seem to be part of their environment. They respond by acquiring
more information and knowledge, but not understanding. In fact,
many futurists (e.g Naisbitt, 1982) characterize the post-industrial era
we are entering as an age of information or knowledge, not as an age of
understanding. Information is descriptive, it is contained in answers
to questions that begin with such words as what, which, who, how many,
when and where. Knowledge is instructive; it is conveyed
by answers to how-to questions. Understanding is explanatory;
it is transmitted by answers to why questions. To understand a system
is to be able to explain its properties and behavior, and to reveal why
it is what it is and why it behaves the way it does.
Information,
knowledge and understanding form a hierarchy. Information presupposes neither
knowledge nor understanding. Knowledge presupposes information and understanding
presupposes both. One can survive without understanding, but not thrive.
Without understanding one cannot control causes; only treat effects, suppress
symptoms. With understanding one can design and create the future.
To
think about anything requires an image or concept of it, a model. To think
about a thing as complex as a social system most people use a model of
something similar, simpler and more familiar. Traditionally, two types
of model have been used in efforts to acquire information, knowledge and
understanding of social systems: mechanistic and organismic.
But in a world of accelerating change, increasing uncertainty and growing
complexity it is becoming apparent that these are inadequate as guides
to decision and action. Alienation, hopelessness, frustration, insecurity,
corruption, tyranny and social unrest are only a few of the many symptoms
of deeply rooted malfunctioning of societies and their institutions. Commonly
prescribed remedies are increasingly ineffective and often make things
worse. The growing number of social crises and dilemmas that we face should
be clear evidence that something is fundamentally wrong with the way we
think about social systems.
Here
we describe and try to explain the deficiencies of the two traditional
ways of thinking about social systems. The principal deficiency is limited
yield of understanding. We then develop a third type of model, ne we believe
does not suffer from these inadequacies, a social system model.
MECHANISTIC MODEL
Mechanistic
models of the world conceptualize it as a machine that works with a regularity
dictated by its internal structure and the causal laws of nature. The world,
like a hermetically sealed clock, is taken to be made up of purposelessness
and passive parts that operate predictably. Any deviation from regularity
is reacted to with changes that restore it; the system is believed to tend
in the long run towards a static equilibrium.
This
type of model is based on two assumptions: that the world can be completely
understood and that such understanding can be obtained by analysis.
Analysis is a three-step thought process. First, it takes apart that which
it seeks to understand. Then it attempts to explain the behavior of the
parts taken separately. Finally, it tries to aggregate understanding of
the parts into an explanation of the whole.
Since
understanding something mechanistically requires understanding its parts,
the parts also have to be taken apart. This process stops only when indivisible
parts, elements, are reached. These, when understood, are believed to make
understanding everything else possible. This doctrine, called reductionism,
is responsible for the prominence in science of such irreducibles as atoms,
chemical elements, cells, basic needs, instincts, direct observations and
phonemes.
Once
the elements are understood, their explanations have to be aggregated into
an understanding of the whole. This requires establishing a relationship
between the parts. The relationship that is assumed to be sufficient to
explain all actions and interactions of the part is cause-effect.
One thing is taken to be the cause of another if it is both necessary and
sufficient for the other.
The
exclusive commitment to cause-effect has three important consequences.
First, because identification of causes provides complete explanations
of their effects, the environment is not required to explain anything.
This environment-free concept of explanation is reflected in such natural
laws as that of freely falling bodies, which apply only in the absence
of an environment. It is also reflected in the predisposition to conduct
research in laboratories, places from which the environment can be excluded.
Secondly,
causes themselves require explanation. This is done by treating them as
effects and finding their causes, which must also be explained. Is there
an end to this regression? Given the mechanist's assumption that the world
is completely comprehensible, the answer must be 'yes'; there has to be
a first cause. This was generally taken to be God and, naturally,
He was taken to be the Creator. God alone is uncaused and, therefore,
not subject to explanation. He must be accepted on faith.
Thirdly,
because of the assumed comprehensibility of the world, everything other
than God has to be assumed to be the effect of some cause and, therefore,
to be determined by that cause. Such determinism leaves no room
for choice, hence purpose, in the natural world.
The
effects of applying mechanistic models to social systems are manifested
by adherents to the so-called classical or traditional school of management.
They way they organize work is a direct consequence of analytical thinking.
They begin by reducing work to elementary tasks, tasks so simple that they
can be performed by one person alone. The simplicity of these tasks facilitates
their mechanization. Only those tasks that are too expensive or complex
to be mechanized are assigned to people. Work is reduced to machine-like
behavior and workers are treated like replaceable machine parts.
Adherence
by parts to rules and regulations is made an end-in-itself either by rewarding
compliance or punishing non-compliance. By this means, human responses
to stimuli are made to approximate mindless physical reactions.
Control
and co-ordination are also analysed and reduced to tasks requiring the
minimal amount of power and judgement at each organizational level. Judgement
is further reduced by establishing policies that offer virtually no choice
except to determine which policy applies to which situation.
Like
the universe, believed, by some, to have been created by God to do His
work, organizations are taken to be instruments of their owners with no
purposes of their own. Corporations, for example, are considered to be
instruments for producing profit for their owners.
Mechanistcally
modelled organizations are structured hierarchically and are centrally
controlled by a completely autonomous authority. Such an authority can
affect any part of the system without being affected by any of them. This
separates the ultimate authority from the system making that authority
an external controller.
All
members of the system other than the one with ultimate authority are deprived
of all information except that required to do their jobs. Instructions
from above are not explained or justified. Blind adherence is expected:
"Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die". People are kept apart
as much as possible. Their interactions are minimized to depersonalize
their relations. Even non-work-related interactions are discouraged.
The
operations of an ideal machine do not vary. Therefore, as long as its input
does not vary, its output will not vary. For this reason controller of
mechanistically modelled social systems focus on inputs rather than outputs.
For example, they assume that control of costs is equivalent to control
of outputs. The quantity of output is assumed to be determined by the quantity
of input. The system is thought of much as a vending machine.
A
mechanistically conceived social system is inflexible. Therefore, it can
operate effectively only if its environment is static or has little effect
on it; that is, where it can operate as a closed system. However, a rapidly
changes environment requires continuous adaptation and learning by organizations
if they are to remain effective. Adaptation and learning require a readiness,
willingness and ability to change, but these are precisely what mechanistically
managed and structured organizations lack.
The
larger social system of which every organization is a part, and other organizations
that are part of that containing system, no longer permit an organization
to ignore its effects on, and the effects on it of, its environment. Recognition
of this interaction poses a severe dilemma to mechanistically conceptualized
organizations. They find it difficult or impossible to be responsive to
environmental changes. As a result, their effectiveness suffers. Increasing
ineffectiveness leads to reinforcement of their rigidity, closer adherence
to rules and regulations. They result is a vicious circle in which such
organizations become more and more dysfunctional (March and Simon, 1958).
THE ORGANISMIC MODEL
A
social system conceptualized as an organism has a purpose of its own: survival
for which growth si taken to be essential. Contraction is believed
to be synonymous with deterioration and decay, with eventual death. Such
a system is taken to be dependent on its environment for essential inputs
(resources). Therefore, if that environment is believed to be changing,
to survive the system must be capable of learning and adaptation.
Growth
is necessary but not sufficient for survival. Nothing can preclude eventual
death, but continuity through reproduction can keep death from being terminal.
Therefore, such systems try to reproduce themselves either by spawning
new organizations (e.g establishing colonies) or by acquiring old ones
(imperialism).
In
an organismically conceptualized corporation, profit, like oxygen in the
case of an organism, is taken to be necessary for survival but not the
reason for it. Profit is taken as a means;growth as an end. With survival
as the ultimate end, planning becomes prediction of environmental changes
and preparation for them.
Preoccupation
with growth creates certain problems: first, the fact that things can grow
only at the expense of other systems and their environments and, secondly,
that exponential growth, the best kind, cannot be sustained forever. Moreover,
there seems to be an optimal size for each type of organization beyond
whichan increase in size leads to a decline in efficiency and effectiveness
(Boulding, 1970).
Because
changes in their environments are considered to be inevitable and relevant,
organismically conceptualized social systems seek a dynamic rather than
a static equilibrium. They operate homeostatically, adjusting the behavior
of their parts to maintain the properties of the whole within acceptable
limits. Their parts are thought of as organs, each with a function the
performance of which contributes to the survival and growth of the whole.
Individuals are regarded as cells whose function is to serve the organs
and the organism of which they are part. Organs and cells are more dificult
to replace than machines or machine parts.
The
executive function is thought of as the brain of the system (Beer, 1981).
It is linked to parts of the system by a communication network through
which it receives information from a variety of sensing organs (e.g diplomatic
corps, intelligence services and marketing departments), and issues directives
that activate and deactivate the parts of the system.
An
organismically conceived social system is organized hierarchically but,
since thinking and sensing are separated, control is not as completely
centralized as it is in the mechanistically conceived system. Different
parts have some degree of self-control, but they do not control the functions
they are intended to carry out. Some parts can interact directly with and,
in some cases, react directly to environmental changes without intervention
of 'the brain'. As well as formal structure, organismic social systems
have an informal one that is maintained by direct communication between
parts. There is also more two-way communication between and within different
levels of the hierarchy in an organismic social system than in a mechanistic
one. Moreover, conformity and obedience of the aprts is not taken to be
as essential as long as they perform well. They are managed by control
of outputs rather than inputs.
Organismic
organizations try to exercise control by specifying desired outputs, leaving
the selection of means to the parts (managed by objectives). The environment
and organizational perormance (outputs) are kept under surveillance to
determine whether they are behaving as expected. If not, correcvtive action
is taken. Thus, management engages in feedback control. This facilitates
both learning and adaptation.
Although
organismically conceived systems are capable of self-control, they can
be influenced by other systems and, in some cases, can be controlled by
them by the application of force. Force may be required to make such an
organization act against its will. A horse, unlike an automobile, cannot
be driven into a wall without compulsion. External control of an organism
is easiest where there is submission or consent, both of which are matters
of choice.
To
treat an organization or other type of social system as an organism is
to fail to recognize the ways in which these differ significantly. In contrast
to an organism, which cannot change its structure more than a limited amount
and still survive, a social system has almost complete control over its
structure (Buckley, 1967). In addition, the relationship that exists between
an organism and its cells and organs is very different from that between
an organization and its parts. One's heart cannot decide for itself that
it does not want to work or wants to work for someone else. The parts of
a social system have purposes of their own and display choice. Therefore,
an effective social system required agreement among its parts and between
its parts and the whole. It requires consensus; an organism does not.
An
organismically conceived system devotes itself to making the best of a
future that it believes to be largely out of its control, but is predictable.
The fact that in an environment characterized by accelerating change, increasing
uncertainty and growing complexity, the possibility of accurate and reliable
forecasts diminishes at an increasing rate. In such an environment the
only hope for a social system lies in its ability to bring more and more
of its future under its own control. To take such an approach requires
a model of a social system different from the two we have reviewed.
THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS MODEL
A
system is a whole that cannot be divided into independent parts; the behavior
of each part and its effect on the whole depend on the behavior of other
parts. Therefore, the essential properties of a system are lost when it
is taken apart; for example, a disassembled automobile does not transport
and a disassembled person does not live. Furthermore, the parts themselves
lose their essential properties when they are separated from the whole;
for example, a detached steering wheel does not steer and a detached eye
does not see.
Recall
that analysis takes a system apart and then tries to explain behavior of
the parts taken separately. It is for this reason that it cannot yield
understanding of a system, only knowledge of how it works. Put another
way: it can reveal a system's structure but not its functions.
Because
the parts of a system are interdependent, it can be shown that even if
each part is independently made to perform as efficiently as possible,
the system as a whole will not perform as effectively as possible. For
example, all-star athletic teams are not known to be the best teams and
may not be able to beat an average team in the league.
The
performance of a system is not the sum of the independent performances
of its parts. It is the product of their interactions. Therefore, effective
management of a system requires management of the interactions of its parts,
not their independent actions. Moreover, since a social system interacts
with its environment, management of this interaction is also required for
it to function effectively.
It
follows, then, that to understand a system as a whole a new non-analytical
approach is needed. Contrary to a widely held belief, a multidisciplinary
approach does not fill this need for reasons revealed in the classical
story of the blind men trying to identify an elephant, each by touching
a different part of its body. The interesting point in this story is not
the predicament of the blind men but the ability of the story-teller to
see the whole. A different version of the same story found in old Persian
literature (Molana Jalaledin Molavi) is about a group of men who encounter
a strange animal in complete darkness. Their efforts to identify it, each
by touching a different part, prove fruitless until someone arrives with
a lamp. Light enables us to synthesize separate observations into a meaningful
whole. This light must be provided by a way of thinking other than analysis.
To
understand a system, its structure, processes and functions have to be
examined. A system's structure is the way its work is divided among its
parts and their efforts co-ordinated, that is the relationships between
its parts. Structure can be understood only if observed in the functioning
of a system. Therefore, analysis, which reveals only the structure of a
system, not its functioning, cannot provide understanding, only knowledge.
Synthetic thinking is required to complement analysis. In the first step
of analysis the thing to be explained is taken apart; in synthetic thinking
it is taken as a part of a larger system. In the second step of analysis
the contained parts are explained; in synthetic thinking the containing
system is explained. In the third step of analysis an effort is made to
aggregate understanding of the parts into an understanding of the whole;
in synthetic thinking understanding of the containing whole is disaggregated
to explain the parts by revealing their role or function in that whole.
In the social systems model synthetic thinking and analysis are taken to
be complementary; neither can replace the other. Both are necessary to
understand a system.
To
understand the functioning of a social system the cause effect relationship
is inadequate. The producer-product relationship (Singer, 1959) is required.
A producer is only necessary, not sufficient, for its product. Therefore,
a producer never completely explains its product; it does not determine
its product. This makes it possible to treat choice, hence purpose, as
an objectively observable property of system behavior. Moreover, since
a producer is not sufficient for its product, reference to its environment
is required to explain its product. Therefore, explanation becomes environment-full
rather than environment-free as it is in the mechanistic model.
As
a consequence, knowledge of the processes by which parts of a system choose
to respond to their environment is essential to understanding the dynamics
of a system which changes its structure. Process, rather than initial conditions,
is responsible for future states; similar conditions (initial states) can
lead to dissimilar outcomes (end states).
In
a mechanistic conception of a system a specific structure (S) causes a
particular function (F), and difference structures cause different functions
(Figure 1). Therefore, to understand a system, knowledge of its structure
(the nature of its components and their relationships) is taken to be all
that is required. This structuralist point of view is based on a deterministic
conception of reality.
In
a social system conception of a social system (1) different structures
can yield the same function, and (2) the same structure can yield different
functions (Figure 2).

This
makes it necessary to understand the relationship between structure and
function keeping in mind that function is not a substitute for structure
any more than form is a substitute for content. They are complements.
The
time-telling function can be produced by such different structures as sundials,
and sand, water, mechanical or electronic clocks. The transportation function
can be produced by cars, ships, trains and automobiles. An educational
system with a specific structure in a particular environment, in addition
to its explicit educational function, also provides daytime child care.
Clocks often have a decorative function as well as time-telling. Therefore,
it is important to note that a redesign of a system to increase its efficiency
with respect to one of its functions may, and often does, decrease its
efficiency with regard to its other functions and, therefore, its overall
effectiveness.
Now,
what is a function? According to Ackoff and Emery (1972) a functional
class is:
...
a set of structurally different individuals, systems or events, each of
which is either a potential or actual producer of members (objects and
events) of a specified class (y) of any type. The function of such a class
is Y-production, and each member of the class can be said to have Y-production
as its function. If an individual displays a type of structural behavior
that is a member of a functional class of behavior displayed by other entities,
then that individual or system can be said to have an extrinsic function.
It is called extrinsic because the function is not one of its own but one
it has by virtue of its membership in a class. The property that forms
such a class is not structural but a common property of production....
A person who can telephone a store, write to it, visit it, or get another
to visit it displays a set of actions (events) that constitute a functional
class defined by, say, acquiring a new shirt. In this case the individual
displays an instrinsic function because its function can be attributed
to it on the basis of its behavior alone. (p. 26).
Using
the difference between cause-effect and producer-product, Ackoff and Emery
also distinguish between three types of system behavior: reactions,
responses and actions. A reaction of a system is a system
event for which another event that occurs to the same system or its environment
is sufficient. Thus, a reaction is an event that is (deterministically)
caused by another event.
A
response of a system is a system event for which another event that
occurs to the same system or its environment is necessary but not sufficient.
Thus, a response is an event of which the system itself is a coproducer.
A person's turning on a light when it gets dark is a response to darkness,
but the light's going on when the switch is turned is a reaction.
An
act of a system is a system event for the occurrence of which no
change in the system's environment is either necessary or sufficient. Acts,
therefore, are self-determined events, autonomous behavior.
Behavioral
Classification of Systems

Systems,
all of whose behavior is reactive, responsive or active can be called reactive,
responsive or active, respectively. However, most systems display some
combination of these types of behavior. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that mechanically conceptualized systems are modelled as predominantly
reactive; organismically conceptualized systems as predominantly responsive;
and socially conceptualized systems as predominantly active (see Table
1).
Reactive,
responsive, and active systems are also correlated with state-maintaining,
goal-seeking and purposeful systems. A state-maintaining
system is one that reacts to changes so as to maintain its state
under different environmental conditions. Such a system can react (not
respond) because what it does is completely determined by the change in
is environment, given the structure of the system. Nevertheless, it can
be said to have the intrinsic function of maintaining the state it maintains
because it can produce this state in a different way under different conditions.
For
example, many heating systems are state-maintaining. An internal controller
turns it on when the room temperature goes below a desired level, and turns
it off when the temperature goes above this level. The state that is maintained
is the room temperature. Such a system is able to adapt to changes but
is not capable of learning because it cannot choose its behavior. It cannot
improve with experience.
A
goal-seeking system is one that can respond differently to
one or more different events in one or more different environments, and
that can respond differently to a particular event in an unchanging environment
until it produces a particular outcome (state). Production of this state
is its goal. Such a system has a choice of behavior, hence is responsive
rather than reactive. Response is voluntary; reaction is not.
For
example, lower-level animals can try to get at food in different ways in
different environments even in the same environment at different times.
If
a goal-seeking system has memory it can learn to pursue its goal more efficiently
over time.
A
purposeful system is one that can produce the same outcome in different
ways in the same environment and can produce different outcomes in the
same and different environments. It can change its ends under constant
conditions. This ability to change ends under constant conditions is what
exemplifies free will. Such systems not only learn and adapt, they
can create. Human beings are examples of such systems.
Purposeful
systems have all the capabilities of goal-seeking and state-maintaining
systems, and goal-seeking systems have the capabilities of state-maintaining
systems. The converse is not true. Therefore, they form a hierarchy.
Social
systems are purposeful systems. Moreover, their parts are purposeful systems,
and they are part of larger social, hence purposeful, systems. To understand
a social system then, one must not only know what the ends of the parts,
system and containing system are, but how these affect their interactions.
Managing a social system not only requires dealing with ends that may be
in conflict at different levels, but dealing with conflicting ends at any
or all of the levels.
Recall
that a mechanistically conceived system is not attributed with a purpose
of its own even though it may serve the purpose of an external controller.
Organismic systems have a purpose of their own: survival, for which growth
is taken to be necessary. Then what is the appropriate purpose of a system
conceptualized as a social system? Development.
DEVELOPMENT
Growth
and development are not the same thing and are not even necessarily associated.
Either can take place with or without the other. A cemetery can grow without
developing and a person may continue to develop long after he or she has
stopped growing. This, of course, is obvious. What is not so obvious is
that many of the problems associated with development derive from the assumption
that economic growth is necessary if not sufficient for development and
that limits to growth limit development.
Growth,
strictly speaking, is an increase in size or number. Its principal, but
not exclusive, domain of relevance is biological, as in the growth of plants
and animals. Social systems are said to grow when they increase in size
or number. Economies are said to grow when the economic value of their
product or the amount of income they generate increases. Growth, however,
is often used metaphorically or figuratively and, in such cases, it is
frequently and incorrectly taken literally. For example, when we speak
of a person 'growing up' we refer to increased maturity. Maturity has no
size or number. It would be non-sensical to speak of a growing culture
or quality of life because size and number are not relevant to them. A
social system, like an individual, can grow by increasing in size or, unlike
an individual, in number without developing. It can also develop without
growing.
Growth
occurs naturally, without choice, in most biological systems. In human
beings and social systems however, choices can deter or accelerate growth
as, for example, in choice of diet or investment portfolio. If someone
has a compulsion to grow, increase in size, we are likely to consider this
person to be a pathological case. For example, medical science increasingly
views obesity as the product of a psychiatric disorder. However, if an
organization has a compulsion to grow we generally consider it to be natural,
even laudable. Why? Because we assume that physical or economic growth
is necessary, if not sufficient, for development. This, as we will try
to show, is not the case. Nevertheless, if limits to growth threatened
an organization's survival, one could understand its preoccupation with
such limits, but not even the authors of The Limits of Growth (Meadows
et al., 1972) claim that this is so. Unfortunately, many have incorrectly
drawn the inference from this book that retarded growth implies retarded
development. Such an error, we believe, is based on a misconception of
the nature of development.
Development
of a person, contrary to what many believe, is not a condition or a state
defined by what or how much that person has. For example, if the products
and services available in the most affluent nation were suddenly showered
on an aborigine, he would not thereby be developed. Development has less
to do with how much a person has than with how much he or she can do
with what he does have. For this reason, Robinson Crusoe and the Swiss
Family are better paradigms of development than J.P Morgan and John D.
Rockefeller.
Development
is the process in which individuals increase their abilities and desires
to satisfy their own needs and legitimate desires, and those of others.
It is at least as much a matter of motivation, information, knowledge,
understanding, and wisdom as it is of wealth. An individual's level
of development is his current ability an desire to satisfy his own
needs and legitimate desires, and those of others.
This
definition requires clarification of the distinction between needs and
desires, and of the meaning of legitimate. By a need we mean
something that is necessary for survival, for example, food and oxygen.
What is needed may or may not be desired; for example, a person who is
unaware of his need for roughage does not desire it. On the other hand,
as is obvious, a person may desire something he does not need.
By
a legitimate desire we mean one the pursuit or fulfillment of which
does not reduce the likelihood of other individuals fulfilling their needs
or (legitimate) desires. This does not preclude interfering with a person
who interferes with others' pursuit of their needs or legitimate desires.
Development,
as we define it, is reflected at least as much in quality of life as in
standard of living. To be developed is to have the desire and capacity
to use effectively whatever has to improve one's own quality of life and
standard of living, and those of others.
It
has become more and more apparent that continued economic growth of a nation
may increase the standard of living, but not necessarily improve the quality
of life. Many argue that at least some of the economically most advanced
nations today are increasing their standards of living at the expense of
quality of life. Many American Indians, for example, asset that although
their asimilation into the surrounding white culture has brought the a
higher standard of living, their quality of life has deteriorated.
All
this is not to say that wealth is irrelevant to development or quality
of life; it is very relevant. How much people can actually improve their
quality of life and that of others depends not only on their motivation,
information, knowledge, understanding and wisdom, but also on what instruments
and resources are available to them. For example, a man can build a better
house with good tools and materials than he can without them. On the other
hand, a developed man can build a better house with whatever tools and
materials he has than a less developed man with the same resources. Furthermore,
a developed man with limited resources can often improve his quality of
life and that of others more than a less developed man with unlimited resources.
It
should also be borne in mind that resources are more often taken
than given. The more developed a person or an organization, the more resources
he or it can find or develop. The more dependent one is on resources that
are given, the less developed that person is. Put another way: resources
are created by what man does with what nature provides. What natures provides
is not a resource until man has transformed it or learns how to use it.
The more developed man is, the more resources he can create or extract
out of nature's offerings. Because development involves an increase of
ability (i.e learning) and one person cannot learn for another, one person
or organization cannot develop another. One can only encourage and facilitate
that development. There is only one type of development: self-development.
One who tries to induce development in another must act like a teacher,
not a doctor. It is not so much a matter of diagnosis and prescription
as it is of encouragement and facilitation.
Therefore,
social systems cannot develop their members and other stakeholders, but
they can and should encourage and facilitate such development. The
development of such systems consists of an increase in their desire
and ability to encourage and facilitate development of their stakeholders.
Effective planning for development requires a major reorientation of organizations
or governments that assume they can develop their members. Development
is not a matter of what an organization or government does, but of what
it encourages and enables its members to do.
The
quality of life (including work life) that a person can realize is the
joint product of his development and the resources available to him. Although
this implies that limited resources may limit improvement of quality of
life, it does not imply that they limit development. Desires and abilities
can increase without an increase of resources. Put another way: development
is potentiality for satisfaction of needs and desires, not the satisfaction
(quality of life or standard of living) actually obtained. A limit is a
point, line, surface, quantity or other boundary that a variable cannot
exceed. For example, nothing can move faster than the speed of light which,
therefore, is a limit. The maximum at which an automobile can travel is
also a limit. Nevertheless, we speak of speed limits which automobiles
obviously exceed. Here 'limit' denotes a quantity that one is not supposed
to but can exceed. Such a limit is better referred to as a constraint
or restriction.
Even
the limit to the speed of an automobile need not limit its driver. He can
take an aeroplane if he wants to travel faster, or he might find something
more desirable than travel. The effect of limits on purposeful individuals
and systems can be evaded either by changing intent or by using better
technology. A limited resource limits us only if we want to do something
that requires more of that resource than is available and there is no suitable
substitute in greater supply. A limited resource ceases to be limiting
if our need for it decreases or if we learn how to use it more effectively;
that is, if we develop.
Limits
to and constraints on a social system's growth are found primarily in its
environment; but the principal limits to and constraints on its development
are found within the system itself. The key to unlimited development is
freedom of choice that is limited only by those who do not limit the choice
of others; that is, freedom that is exercised morally.
CONCLUSION
We
have tried to show that there are three different ways of looking at and
thinking about social systems: as mechanistic, organismic or social systems.
We have argued that the first two types of modelling severely limit our
ability to understand such systems, hence to control them. A mechanistic
model yields a description of the actions and interactions of the parts
of a social system, and therefore, knowledge of its structure. It does
not yield understanding of the behavior of either parts or the whole. Organismic
models of social systems lead to identification of the functions of the
parts in the wholes and, therefore, to understanding of the parts, but
not the whole. The social model conceptualizes a social system as a part
of a larger purposful system as well as a system with purposeful parts.
It focuses on both the functions of the parts in the whole and of the whole
in the larger containing system of which it is part. Therefore, it can
yield understanding of both the behavior of the parts and the whole.
Mechanistic
management strives for efficiency and tries to construct social systems
that behave like machines, and to train people to behave like machine parts.
This results in a bureaucratic structure that is capable of neither learning
nor adapting In an environment characterized by an increasing rate of change,
uncertainty and complexity, mechanistically managed organizations tend
to become increasingly dysfunctional, to lose effectiveness, and often
to die although burial may be postponed.
Organismic
management strives for growth as necessary for survival. It conceptualizes
the parts of a social system as organs with essential functions but no
purposes of their own. Their only reason for existence is their service
to the whole. Their environments are seen as purposeless and passive providers
of necessary inputs to, and outputs of, organisms. Such organizations tend
to be managed more permissively than bureaucracies, focusing on meeting
assigned goals, leaving choice of means by which these goals are to be
pursued to the parts that have responsibility for their attainment. They
give more attention to efficiency than effectiveness. For them, planning
consists of predicting a future environment believed to be beyond their
control, and preparing for it.
Social-system
management is concerned with development and tries to serve the purposes
of the system, its parts, and its containing systems. There may be conflict
between these levels or within them. Therefore, resolution or dissolution
of conflict is one of management's principal responsibilities. A social
system should be viewed as an instrument of those it affects. Its principal
function is to encourage and facilitate their new development. For management
of social systems, planning should consist of designing a desirable future
and inventing or finding ways of approximating it as closely as possible.
Such management should attempt to maximize the freedom of choice of those
it affects. Only from experience of choice can one learn, hence develop.
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